ABSTRACT. Positive polarity items (PPIs) are generally thought to have the boring property that they cannot scope below negation. The starting point of the paper is the observation that their distribution is significantly more complex; specifically, someone/something-type PPIs share properties with negative polarity items (NPIs). First, these PPIs are disallowed in the same environments that license yet type NPIs; second, adding any NPI-licenser rescues the illegitimate constellation. This leads to the conclusion that these PPIs have the combined properties of yet-type and ever-type NPIs:
NPIs and PPIs -do they have much in common?
Natural languages have two broad categories of polarity sensitive expressions: negative polarity items (NPIs) and positive polarity items (PPIs). According to the crudest characterization, NPIs must, and PPIs must not, occur in the scope of negation. For instance:
(1) I *(don't) see anything.
(2) I (*don't) see something. * unless some scopes over not, or not is an emphatic denial Is reference to the scope of negation in the two definitions a significant commonality?
Initially it does not seem so. First, the relation between negation and any is thought of as a case of syntactic or semantic licensing, an altogether respectable kind of grammatical phenomenon, whereas the relation between negation and some seems like a boring prohibition (Horn 1989; 2001b:157) or a matter of pragmatic preference (as in Krifka 1992) . Second, it is well-known that NPIs come in many flavors (Zwarts 1981 and subsequent literature), whereas PPIs seem to singlemindedly avoid scoping below a particular operator. If so, mentioning NPIs and PPIs on the same page seems nothing more than classificatory convenience.
The second dissimilarity is the easiest to show to only be apparent. Van der Wouden (1997) observes that the three classical types of NPIs are matched by three comparable types of PPIs in Dutch (see the semantic definitions in section 2). Outside Dutch, class (3a) is exemplified by Korean pakkey `only' (an exceptive, Nam 1994), (3b) by English yet, and (3c) by English ever, for example.
(3) NPIs:
[a] Must be in the scope of an antimorphic operator: mals `tender', pluis `plush'
[b] Must be in the scope of an antiadditive operator: ook maar `also but = any', hand voor ogen `hand before eyes', met een vinger `with a finger'
[c] Must be in the scope of a decreasing operator: hoeven `need' (4) PPIs:
[a] Must not be in the scope of an antimorphic operator: al `already', nog `still'
[b] Must not be in the scope of an antiadditive operator: een beetje `a little', nogal `rather', maar `but'
[c] Must not be in the scope of a decreasing operator: allerminst `not-at-all', niet `not'
Although the above NPI typology is not exhaustive (some NPIs are licensed in non-veridical contexts, see e.g. Giannakidou 1998) and not uncontroversial (decreasingness needs to be taken with a grain of salt, see e.g. von Fintel 1999), this much parallelism should already give us pause.
Why are NPIs and PPIs sensitive to (at least roughly) the same semantic properties? Given van der Wouden's 1997 very general framework of collocational behavior, the fact that semantic notions like downward monotonicity and antiadditivity play a role in natural language would make it surprising if NPIs did not have PPI counterparts. This, however, leaves open whether a more specific connection can be established.
The existence of such parallelisms is one of the main building blocks of the analysis of
PPIs that I will be proposing (although I am not yet in a position to explain why each particular NPI or PPI is sensitive to a given property).
Secondly, recall that NPIs and PPIs are thought to differ along the dimension of licensing versus prohibition. Progovac 2000 has made a proposal to bring PPIs into the licensing fold.
According to this, PPIs are licensed in a non-negative polarity phrase that is located above the negative polarity phrase in clause structure; therefore, if the clause happens to contain a negation, the PPI automatically scopes above it. I show that PPIs cannot in general be required to scope above negation and offer an alternative characterization of PPIs in licensing terms.
A third important building block of my analysis is a fact already noted by Jespersen: while (5) is unacceptable on the `not>some' reading, the same reading is available in (6):
(5) You didn't see something.
cannot mean `You saw nothing' (6) I don't believe that you didn't see something.
can mean `I don't believe that you saw nothing'
Jespersen reasoned that (6) was good because the two negations cancel out (viz., I believe that you saw something). C. L. Baker 1970 noticed that other elements, e.g. adversative predicates, have the same effect and developed a polarity-switching mechanism that essentially generalizes
Jespersen's idea. 1 I show that this idea cannot be correct. My own explanation of why the illegitimate PPI constellation is rescued in certain contexts will, once more, exploit the NPI-PPI parallelism.
In this paper I provide a detailed description of the behavior of PPIs of the sort someone and something, and make two main arguments. In the first part of the paper I argue that these PPIs are double NPIs. They simultaneously exhibit the licensing needs of both class (3b) and class (3c) items -let us for the moment express this by saying that they have both a yet-feature and an ever-feature. These features are "dormant", unless "activated" by a yet-licensing environment. The peculiar PPI-distribution is due to the fact that a yet-licensor activates both features but licenses only one of them. Therefore the ever-feature requires the presence of a second licenser.
The second argument offers a way to make sense of dormant features and activation by relating them to the proposals in de Swart and Sag's 2002 for negative concord and in Postal 2000a,b for any and no. I will argue that NPI-features are to be interpreted as negations.
Dormancy occurs when the two negations simply cancel out semantically. Licensing is effected by resumptive quantification. The activation/licensing pattern of some turns out to fill gaps in Postal's system postulated for any and no. Finally, I consider the idea that the characteristics of NPIs and PPIs are intimately linked to a scalar or a referential semantics.
Part One: PPIs as double NPIs

Refining the description of the distribution of PPIs
In this section I revisit the standard caracterization of someone/something type PPIs. The precise description of their distribution will be fundamental in developing the analysis.
There are various reasons to focus on someone/something type PPIs. First, they belong to the by far largest class of PPIs, those sensitive to antiadditive operators (cf. van der Wouden's class (4b)), but within this class, their lexical semantics is straightforward as compared to that of would rather, would just as soon, etc. Second, being rather light they do not very easily act as specific indefinites and therefore allow us to separate the extra-wide scoping abilities of specific indefinites from the par excellence PPI-restriction vis-a-vis negation. Third, these PPIs are "rescuable" in the sense of (6) and thus exhibit an interesting combination of properties. Fourth, their properties appear to be shared by various PPIs in other languages, including Hungarian, which makes it easier to ascertain that this cluster of properties is not accidental.
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PPIs that do not belong to this type will only receive tangential attention here. Likewise, this paper will not address the cross-linguistic variation in the inventory of PPIs. For example, Szabolcsi 2002 observes that in Hungarian and in various other languages, (the counterparts of) a(n)-phrases and disjunctions exhibit the same PPI-properties as (the counterparts of) somephrases, whereas or contrasts with some in English.
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A note regarding notation. Many of the examples discussed in this paper are acceptable on the `some>not' reading but, crucially, not on the `not>some' reading. In these cases I will attach the asterisk to the interpretation, not to the string itself.
PPIs and denial/contrast
Prior to setting out to review the data, note that PPIs can in fact occur within the immediate scope of clausemate negation if the latter is construed as an emphatic denial of a similarly phrased statement, e.g.: 4 (7) He found something.
Wrong! He DIDn't / DID NOT find something. √ not > some Denial blurs the picture and thus must be controlled for. One useful method may be to judge the negated clause in the context of a why-question, which helps suppress the denial reading.
(8) Why did John look so disappointed?
Because he didn't find something. * not > some Roger Schwarzschild (p.c.) points out that contrast, not just denial, may be the more appropriate category. In the following example, where negation is focused and something is unstressed, thè not>some' reading is fully acceptable in the second consequent:
(9) If you push the red button, you will see something, but if you press the blue button you WON'T see something.
PPIs cannot take narrower scope than what?
It is not specifically negation that our chosen PPIs are sensitive to. Consider the paradigm below.
(10)- (11)- (12) show that besides clausemate negation, some cannot be in the immediate scope of a negative quantifier or without, although, as (13) shows, it is happy below at most five. In the extraclausal negation cases, some is interchangeable with any, in the sense that on the relevant reading (24) is truth-conditionally equivalent to (28), although the some sentence lacks the "widening plus strengthening" flavor associated with any (cf. Kadmon and Landman 1994 and related literature).
(28) I don't think that John called anyone.
In the intervention cases, some cannot be replaced by any because the licensing of any is blocked by the interveners that shield some from negation (cf. Kroch 1979 , Linebarger 1987 (29) *John doesn't always call anyone.
All the parallel observations hold in Hungarian for indefinite pronouns formed with valasome', noun phrases with egy `a(n), one' and disjunctions (vagy `or'). 8 6 In the Hungarian counterpart of (24), the complement is preferably in the conditional, not in the indicative. This conditional functions much like the subjunctive of negation in Romance and, inspired by Giannakidou 1998, may be regarded as a polarity sensitive item itself. Traces of such a preference might be detectable in English. (i) is better on the relevant reading than (24).
[i] I don't believe that he'd have done something like that.
7 Non-numerical indefinites, bare plurals, any, and modal can do not count as interveners in either case. Similarly, they do not induce weak islands; see Zwarts 1993 and Honcoop 1998. 8 These data were first noticed, and are discussed in detail, in Recall that "immediate" means that there is no scopal intervener.
I note that although the investigation in this paper focuses on some-PPIs, more exotic members of the class like would rather appear to share similar properties. For example:
(43) *John wouldn't rather eat Chinese.
(44) John wouldn't always rather eat Chinese.
(45) I am surprised that John wouldn't rather eat Chinese.
[iv] Ha nem eszünk vagy iszunk, végünk. √ if ( not > or) If we don't eat or drink, we are doomed'
Russian kogo-to `someone-acc'and ili `or' seem the same (Y. Pomerantsev and A. Stepanov, p.c.) . On the other hand, Korean utun haksaeng-ul `some student-acc' (Seungwan Yoon, p.c.) and Dutch of `or' phrases (M. den Dikken, p.c.) seem to be non-rescuable PPIs. I will need to better understand the polarity systems of the latter languages before addressing these facts. Nonrescuable PPIs may be analyzable along the lines of Progovac 2000 (see section 4).
Questions
The questions that emerge from the foregoing discussion are as follows: (46 A very natural answer to the question why PPIs can't scope below clausemate negation might be that they are for independent reasons forced to scope above it. If so, there is no need to talk about a prohibition at all. Discussing the Serbo-Croatian PPI ne(t)ko `someone' , Progovac proposes a specific implementation of the idea that PPIs must scope above clausemate negation. She assumes that a PPI has a syntactic feature [-neg] to be checked in a compatible Polarity Phrase. "... there are two polarity phrases, the lower one typically associated with sentential negation particles, say NegP, and the higher one typically associated with other types of polarity information. Since the PPI in [John did not see someone] cannot check its [-neg] features in the lower negative PolP (or NegP), it is forced to raise to the higher PolP" (Progovac 2000) I fully endorse the positive spirit of this proposal and appreciate the various elegant consequences Progovac points out it has. But there are reasons to look further for an explanation.
The most straightforward reason is that, as seen above, the PPIs under discussion in this paper happily scope below even clausemate negation under at least two circumstances:
(i) another operator scopally intervenes between negation and the PPI, or (ii) the [negation > PPI] unit is in an NPI-licensing context.
(49) John didn't offend someone because he was malicious (but because he was stupid).
√ not > because ... > some (50) John didn't say something at every party.
√ not > every > some (51) I regret that John didn't call someone. √ regret > not > some (52) If we don' t call someone, we are doomed.
Neither of these possibilities should be available if the PPI was forced to scope above NegP, the locus of negation.
Progovac does not discuss data of type (i). She does discuss cases like type (ii), but evaluates them differently. In the spirit of her own proposal, she suggests that the PPI scopes above the clausemate negation though below the extraclausal one:
(53) Ne tvrdim da Milan nekoga ne voli.
I don' t claim of someone that Milan does not like him = There is no person of whom I claim that Milan does not like him'
Notice that the reading Progovac attributes to (53) is different from the one we are interested in:
it is `not>some>not', i.e. `every', rather than `not>not>some', i.e. `some'. In other words, on this reading the higher negation does not rescue an otherwise illegitimate constellation; there was none to begin with.
I leave it open whether Progovac's analysis of Serbo-Croatian PPIs is correct, i.e.
whether cases of intervention ("shielding") and "rescuing" apply to ne(t)ko. But her proposal cannot be the general account of the PPI phenomenon I am concerned with because it does not cover at least the English and the Hungarian data, cf. (i) and (ii) above.
More generally, Progovac's account seems to rest on the tacit assumption that PPIs are specific indefinites in the sense that they are headed for a relatively high position in clausal structure and have the ability to scope above negation to begin with. But there are PPIs that are
clearly not like that. Take non-referential expressions such as objects of creation verbs and measure phrases, which are sensitive to negative islands. The following sentences are strange or unacceptable, because the PPI character of the expression is incompatible with narrow scope, whereas its negative island sensitive character prevents it from scoping above negation:
(54) * John doesn't appreciate this somewhat.
(55) ?? John didn't take some time off.
(56) ?? John didn't come up with something.
Such PPIs, however, are perfectly happy when an NPI-licensor is added, showing that in this case they are legitimately scoping below the clausemate negation:
(57) I regret that John doesn't appreciate this somewhat.`... to any extent'
If John doesn't appreciate this somewhat... John not ate or slept *`John didn' t eat or didn' t sleep' (only `either John didn' t eat or John slept' ) (61) Nem hiszem, hogy János ne evett vagy aludt volna' not think-I that John not ate or slept aux I don' t think that John didn' t eat or sleep' = `I don' t think that he did neither'
14 Interestingly, while Russian and Serbo-Croatian verbal disjunctions are akin to Hungarian ones in that the scope of negation does not extend to the second disjunct, they are not rescuable in the manner of (61). On the other hand, nominal disjunctions are rescuable PPIs in these languages. I thank A. Stepanov and Z. Boskovic for the data.
The moral seems to be that the PPI phenomenon is most safely and profitably studied using expressions that are unable to scope above clausemate negation. PPIs functioning as specific indefinites have extra possibilities that are characteristic of them, but not of the PPI phenomenon in general.
We have thus established that the desired positive (licensing) statement of the PPIgeneralization cannot simply force the PPI to invariably scope in a position above negation.
Rescuing by an NPI-licensor is NPI-licensing
Next, let us address the question as to why NPI-licensing contexts enable the PPI to scope immediately under a local negation. Recall that Jespersen's answer was that when an extra negation is added, the two negations cancel out and the PPI is in an innocuous positive context.
If this explanation is correct, the rescuing facts are semantically trivial and offer no further insight into the PPI phenomenon.
Is the cancelling-out account of rescuing tenable?
First we must ask if Jespersen's suggestion might extend to the rescuing effect of the full set of NPI-licensors. Von Fintel 1999 claims that they can all be analyzed as (at least) Strawsondecreasing. Strawson-decreasingness is a property that characterizes the entailment relations between sentences in situations where their presuppositions are fulfilled. 15 For example:
(62) I regret that John ate a vegetable.
(63) I regret that John ate spinach.
(62) does not entail (63), because John may have eaten cabbage, not spinach, for instance. But if the vegetable John ate happened to be spinach, then the fact that I regret that he ate a vegetable entails that I regret that he ate spinach. In other words, in situations where the presupposition of (63) is fulfilled, the contribution of regret itself is a decreasing one. [a] I regret that John didn't come up with something scary.
[b] I regret that John didn't come up with something.
The entailment probably goes through; similarly for only, analyzed along the same lines: If so, then if von Fintel's approach is generally successful and being in a Strawson-increasing environment is sufficient for our PPIs to be licit, then Jespersen's proposal extends to the full set of rescuers.
I will argue, however, that the rescuing phenomenon is not what the above train of thoughts makes it out to be. I am not going to discredit the examples reviewed above. Instead, I
am going to present other relevant examples that cannot be accounted for in this way.
The above argument rests on the assumption that PPIs are sensitive to the monotonicity properties of the full context in which they occur. (The cancelling out argument effectively says that the two decreasing functions are composed into an increasing one.) But this is implausible to begin with. Recall that PPIs are only allergic to clausemate negation and are happy within the scope of a higher negation. But they are in an equally antiadditive context in both: if an item that licenses weak (ever-type) NPIs is added scopally immediately above it. This points to the conclusion that the rescuing effect is nothing but NPI-licensing.
Consider, first, the fact that the set of NPI-licensors is not a simple and natural set.
Therefore when we observe that the exact same set is relevant in connection with a new phenomenon, it cannot easily be taken to be pure coincidence. (74) I didn't expect that John would say anything because this was a public event ( *but because I know how he is).
(75) I didn't expect that John wouldn't say something because this was a public event ( *but because I know how he is).
A third similarity is that once an NPI has found its licensor, adding another negative operator above it does not hurt. This is a non-trivial property since the expanded context is increasing. We have seen above that rescuing behaves the same way.
(76) I don't think that John didn't come up with anything.
(77) I don't regret that John didn't come up with something.
√ not > some [AA-Op > PPI] differs from time-honored NPIs in that it is not a lexical entry and does not denote a minimal amount. This, I suggest, is a challenge for NPI-theories, rather than a reason to reject the newcomer.
PPIs are double NPIs
Why is [AA-Op > PPI] a NPI? Let us focus on the relation between AA-Op and the PPI.
The first clue, I suggest, is that the semantic property the PPI detests is antiadditivity. (79) I haven't been here yet.
(80) No one has been here yet.
(81) *At most five people have been here yet.
(82) *I regret that you have been here yet. As a third clue, recall that a scopal intervener shields the PPI from the local antiadditive, e.g.,
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(95) He didn't *(always) come up with something.
To summarize, we find an uncanny similarity as regards anti-additivity, clausemateness, A reviewer raises the interesting question of how the proposal in the text might account for items like Dutch ooit `ca. ever' that van der Wouden 1997 calls bipolar: they require a decreasing licensor (an NPI-property) but cannot occur under a local antimorphic item (he calls this a PPI-property). Van der Wouden argues that NPI-hood and PPI-hood are two primitive properties and may therefore coexist in one item. As the reviewer notes, if van der Wouden's analysis is correct and I wished to assimilate ooit to the PPIs in (98), I would predict that they can only occur in two-licensor environments, contrary to fact. Apart from the fact that the properties ooit is sensitive to are not the same as those in (98), I believe that van der Wouden's bipolar analysis may be avoided if the fact that ooit cannot occur in a local antimorphic context is built into the characterization of the licensing of ooit as a NPI. The same holds for SerboCroatian i-NPIs, which, as van der Wouden points out, have a similar distribution, and for their Hungarian counterparts, e.g. valami is `something even'. The bigger issue that this question points to, however, is that although the purely semantic characterization of the classes of licensors is by and large successful, it faces some embarrassing problems. In addition to the fact that "decreasing but not antimorphic" may be a funny semantic property, Horn 1997 notes that the overtness of negation may make a difference for NPI-licensing even when two items have the same Boolean properties, e.g. ?Nobody but Chris/*?Only Chris slept a wink last night. Likewise, Paul Postal (p.c.) points out that an amount of milk equivalent to zero is truth-conditionally equivalent to no milk but does not license NPIs. In this paper I do not subject the licensing properties to further scrutiny and simply take over the characterizations offered in the literature.
Part Two: PPIs, NPIs, and negative concord 7. "Dormant" versus "active" NPI-features: double negation versus resumptive quantification
The discussion of "active" and "dormant" features points to clear desiderata for the semantics. The fact that non nemo can antecede non-c-commanded anaphora may seem surprising:
according to one of the basic tenets of Dynamic Semantics, one negation "freezes" an existential (eliminates its dynamic potential to bind a non-c-commanded pronoun) and another negation does not "defrost" it. However, Krahmer and Muskens 1994:181 conclude that "we can take it as a general rule that as far as truth conditions and the possibility of anaphora are concerned double negations in standard English behave as if no negation was present." Hungarian nem kevés ember not few people', which is similar in the relevant respect, is also capable of anteceding crosssentential pronouns.
Naturally, the proposal to add two negations to the lexical representation does not extend to expressions like a person or persons, since they are not PPIs; their standard treatments remain in effect.
With the ¬¬∃ interpretation of some-phrases in mind, let us see what happens when both features of the PPI are licensed by appropriate licensers. I propose to interpret licensing as the formation of a binary quantifier. Binary quantifiers bind two variables simultaneously or, viewed from a generalized quantifiers perspective, operate on relations, not properties (May 1989, Keenan and Westerståhl 1994) . Their syntactic formation is known as absorption. The idea here is to factor out the negative components of the two licensors and to let each form a binary quantifier with the negation corresponding to one of the NPI-features. For example:
(104) At most five boys didn't call someonè not more than five boys not called not-not-one'
no<x,y>[x(more than five) boys no<z,w> [z(called) w (y(one]))]
Notice that by absorbing the licenser negation and the licensee negation into a single negative quantifier we effectively eliminate the licensee. Thus, the two negations postulated for PPIs "disappear" both in (99)-(101) and in (104), albeit in very different ways.
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What kind of binary quantification is at work here? Assuming that each negation is construed as a negative determiner whose restriction is a set of individuals or events or degrees, the binary quantifier envisaged here might equally well be a cumulative, a branching, or a resumptive one. These three schemata yield identical results when the input quantifiers are both negative, although they may diverge on other inputs (van Benthem 1983 , Sher 1990 will not be relevant to us and I will ignore it from now on. As regards deletion, it turns out that the appropriate deleter of the ¬ of ¬∃ is a local anti-additive (see the next section).
Deviations from this prototypical situation may occur in the cases of lexical gaps: for
example, yet spells out ¬∃ under raising/deletion, but it does not have a negation-retaining morphological counterpart.
One extremely interesting aspect of this proposal is that it does not rely on mechanisms that filter completed structures for well-formedness. Sentences with NPIs will always be wellformed, because the morphemes any, yet, ever, etc. appear only where the given underlying representations are legitimately mapped to them. Thus the system conforms to the requirement of being failure proof, which has always been at the heart of lexicalist theories like HPSG and categorial grammar and is advocated in Chomsky 2001. 25 Prior to proceeding further with details, let us immediately ask what is to be meant by deletion. Postal has a fully morphosyntactic mechanism in mind. In contrast, I envisage a semantic mechanism with stipulated morphological reflexes. In line with the suggestion in section 7, I propose to identify NPI-licensing with the absorption of the licenser negation and the pertinent negative component of the NPI into a binary resumptive quantifier. enter into a specifier--head relation and the uninterpretable member of the pair is deleted. In the present case, both negations are semantically significant, therefore feature checking is effected by binary resumption.
Intervention effects
The use of resumptive quantification will explain why scopal interveners block NPI-licensing and shield PPIs, e.g., (109) a. * I didn't always say anything.
b. I didn't always say something.
Developing de Swart's 1992 proposal for intervention effects in split constructions (see (110)),
Honcoop 1998 characterizes intervention effects in general as cases where an operator is separated from its restriction by a scopal element, and uses Dynamic Semantics to explain why this is bad.
(110) *Combien as-tu beaucoup conduit __ de camions? Mary); though see Horn 2000 for some problematic examples. On the standard view, any woman is an existential; if so, the above sentences are predicted to be ungrammatical, contrary to fact. Moltmann proposes to form negative (universal) n-ary quantifiers <no man, any woman> and <not, any woman> and let the exceptive modify these. Although Moltmann never intended this to be a proposal for NPI-licensing, Ben-Shalom suggests that we might assume that in fact the relation between any woman and the negative is always established by n-ary quantification. Given my general concerns, however, I will be opting for a different kind of n-ary quantification than Moltmann. This allows me to preserve Postal's idea that any-phrases modifiable by exceptives are underlyingly negative quantifiers. Always in (109) will separate the operator no at least from the thing-portion of its binary restriction. In this way, the present proposal naturally predicts the sensitivity of NPI-licensing to
Linebarger's 1987 intervention effects.
In fact, Honcoop 1998 himself sought to subsume the intervention effects in NPIlicensing under his general theory, but he did so with reference to the mechanics of the computation of scalar implicatures. I believe that the present proposal is preferable, because it extends to the cases where no scalar implicatures are involved, cf. section 11.
Negative concord
As was mentioned in fn. 21, de Swart and Sag 2002 exploit the ability of two negations to either cancel out or to undergo resumption to account for the ambiguity of (112): 27 (112) Personne n' aime personne.
(a) no one is such that they love no one (everyone loves someone, double negation reading) 27 De Swart and Sag take French ne to be semantically vacuous, so for them, only the two instances of personne are relevant. But both mechanisms generalize to n distinct operators. The asymmetrical scopal option (a) yields a positive statement if the number of negations is even and a negative one if the number of negations is odd. The resumptive option (b) yields a single negative, no matter how many negatives enter into the resumptive quantification. This is crucial because negative concord may involve an arbitrary number of negative quantifiers. I don't demand that they arrest anyone'
In this paper I do not attempt to go into details with negative concord but tentively adopt de Swart and Sag' s 2002 theory. Treating negative polarity and negative concord with the same semantic device seems quite natural. After all, they are variations on the same meaning.
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Resumption will play a role in the proposed grammar in both its binary and its arbitrarily n-ary versions. Licensing is always binary resumption. On the other hand, negative concord may involve an arbitrary number of negative quantifiers; likewise, the same licensor may license an arbitrary number of negative polarity items that do not c-command each other, e.g.:
(114) No one talked with any man but Bill about any woman but Susan on any day but Sunday.
I assume that the any-phrases in (114) are first absorbed into a ternary quantifier (form one big NPI), which then establishes its relation with the licensor no one in a single step of binary resumption. In contrast, negative concord is effected in a single n-ary step (a big negative quantifier is formed), as in de Swart and Sag, and no licensing step is involved. (116) *At most five people said anything but hello.
(117) I said nothing but hello.
(118) *I didn't say NOthing but hello.
(118) is to be compared with the fully legitimate double negation reading in (119); the significance of the pragmatically and intonationally distinct denial reading will be discussed in connection with (129).
(119) I didn't say NOthing (although I didn't say much). `I said something'
Another type of evidence for the ambiguity is that those instances of any and no that can be modified by exceptives can undergo negative fronting, e.g.
(120) a. I didn't think that any gorilla (but Kong) would they try to train.
b. * At most five people think that any gorilla would they try to train.
Postal concludes that both determiners are ambiguous at least between a negative and an existential version, and the two versions occur in different contexts.
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Postal assumes that the underlying representation of those instances of no and any that can host exceptives involves ¬∃, which is equivalent to a negative universal (∀¬), as desired.
The interpretation of the sentence relies on this, but morphology may spell it out in more than one way. If the negation stays in place, the determiner is spelled out as no, as in I saw no one (but Bill) . If the negation is raised out or is deleted by an appropriate deleter, the determiner is spelled out as any, as in No one saw anyone (but Bill). To account for the contrast in (115)- (116) the deleter of this underlying negation must be a local anti-additive operator.
The above considerations serve as the initial motivation for postulating some "invisible negations". But more important to our present concerns are those any/no-phrases that do not host exceptives and are therefore diagnosed as underlying existentials. In the interest of a unitary mechanism that maps underlying representations to morphology, Postal assumes that these in fact involve two negations, ¬¬∃. Since this is equivalent to ∃, the enrichment does not affect the semantics while being instrumental in getting the morphology right. The two negations are dealt with in two separate steps. The lower negation gets deleted by the higher one. The higher one may either stay in place or get deleted by an external deleter, which in this case may be any
Strawson-decreasing operator. In other words, the quantifier will end up with either one negative or none. Now the same rule applies as above: one ¬ left in place spells no, no ¬ left in place spells any.
It is straightforward to identify the single negation in Postal's ¬∃ with the lower negation in his ¬¬∃: the former is said to require a local anti-additive deleter and the latter always turns out to be deleted by one (the higher negation in the same DP).
In the Appendix I write out some analyses and add the "Delete even numbers of negation" rule, but these details are not crucial to central concern of the present paper.
Placing PPIs into context
I propose that Postal's system as outlined above can be seen as the periodic table of elements:
when the known elements are arranged in their proper places, the existence of further, hitherto unknown elements is predicted. I claim that the PPIs described previously in this paper fit into Postal's system; in fact, they fill gaps in the system. One advantage of noticing this fact is that certain peculiarities of the PPI's distribution will now require no specific stipulation.
The some-any-no paradigm for ¬¬∃
Recall that in section 6 I concluded that PPIs have two NPI-features: one that requires a local antiadditive licensor and another that is happy with any old Strawson-decreasing one. I noted that they may remain "dormant" or get licensed individually. In section 7 I proposed that these features be interpreted as negations which either cancel out (dormancy) or enter into two separate resumptive quantifications. This makes sense if NPI-licensing is in general interpreted using resumptive quantification, and in section 8 I proposed to make that move. In section 9 I summarized some aspects of Postal's work which, entirely independently, had concluded that those any-forms and no-forms that receive an existential interpretation have two underlying negations that may get deleted on the way to surface morphology.
I am now proposing that the some-forms I am investigating are just another way of spelling out an underlying ¬¬∃. More precisely, I intend a parallel claim to hold of all PPIs that have the same distribution as these some-forms. Disjunctions in Hungarian and several other languages are one case in point, as demonstrated in detail in Szabolcsi 2002; they will be interpreted as λpλq¬¬(p∨q). Some-any-no just constitute a particularly nice paradigm that has no accidental gaps. Items like would rather may be regarded as elements of a paradigm that has accidental gaps in both the "no-slot" and in the "any-slot". were two and one was licensed DP-internally and the other externally.
In a negative concord language the mapping algorithm must be extended to cater to nwords surfacing under resumption. In English No one loves no one is a somewhat isolated case and I will not attempt to bring it into the picture. are first absorbed into a single NPI. Given our semantics, this case will be indistinguishable from (121b), where one of the NPI-features was licensed DP-internally by the other, the latter being licensed DP-externally. But in this constellation the spell-out rule chooses any, not some.
These observations illustrate the failure proof character of the proposed grammar, pointed out above.
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31 If the given item is part of a defective paradigm that has no negation-retaining form, we get unacceptability due to the morphological gap.
In connection with (123c), recall that there are several cases where both negations are left in place: I said something, I don't think that he said something, and Few people said something.
(That merely decreasing few does not set off the activation process is due to the fact that the negation corresponding to the strong-NPI feature intervenes between it and the weak-NPI feature it might license.) Why is the same not possible in the presence of a local anti-additive operator,
i.e. why cannot *No one said something arise in that way?
To pave the way to answering this question, notice the unacceptability of (123), in contrast to (124) does not intervene between AA-Op and the negation embodying its strong-NPI feature (call it ¬1). If ¬2 intervened, it would shield ¬1 from AA-Op. That is, the hierarchy inside someone must be ¬1¬2∃. The fact that plain I saw someone is acceptable points to the same conclusion: the strong-NPI feature ¬1 can remain dormant only if it is not in the immediate scope of ¬2.
How does this square with other considerations? Notice that in the rescuing case, e.g. Only John didn't call someone, the strong-NPI feature is licensed by the closer operator not and the weak-NPI feature by the farther operator only John. If the two licensing relations must form a nesting dependency, it supports the conclusion that the strong-NPI feature is higher, i.e. that we have ¬1¬2∃. This result contrasts with the ¬2¬1∃ hierarchy for any and no on their existential interpretation. Notice that in the case of any and no, the higher negation itself can be licensed by any Strawson-decreasing licenser. Thus the structures underlying any and no on the one hand and some on the other are not, and cannot be, identical as regards the hierarchy of the two NPIfeatures.
Recall that in the present setup, these unacceptable sentences might arise when both NPI-features of someone remain "dormant" (unlicensed) . (129) someone, as discussed in fn. 32. It may well be that the cross-linguistic variation can be captured along these lines. Pursuing these connections must be left to further research, however.
11. Is polarity sensitivity grounded in scalar or referential lexical semantics?
This paper has argued that certain expressions are endowed with "NPI-features", embodied by negations in their lexical semantics. NPI-hood and PPI-hood are not shown to follow from other lexical semantic properties of these items. The question arises whether this agnostic position misses some obvious empirical generalizations. In this section I consider two candidates:
grounding NPI-hood in scalarity and PPI-hood in referentiality.
For a long time, the licensing of NPIs was studied without asking why NPIs want to be within the scope of a decreasing operator. In recent years the tide has turned: it has been suggested that NPIs extend the domain of quantification and are subject to a strengthening requirement, or that NPIs being focussed minimal amount expressions, they give rise to contradictory scalar implicatures unless they are in an implication reversing context. (See Kadmon and Landman 1993 , Lahiri 1997 , Krifka 1992 These, of course, are merely agnostic conclusions, drawn from specific premisses. There is nothing in principle to exclude the possibility that polarity sensitivity is derivable from lexical premisses that have not been considered.
Appendix
This Appendix summarizes some technical aspects of the analyses in Postal 2000a, for the reader whose interest goes beyond how this system forms a backdrop of this paper. The reader should bear in mind that this is my own brief summary of another linguist's ongoing research. It lacks the factual richness of the original and it may well differ from the final stage of Postal's work.
Postal assigns any and no forms two underlying representations: ¬∃ (when the item can host a but-exceptive) or ¬¬∃ (when it cannot). As explained in the main text, such a negation may stay in place, raise out, or be deleted by an appropriate deleter. The spell-out rule is this:
when one negation stays in place, the determiner is no; when no negation stays in place, the surface form is any (or ever, yet, squat, etc. depending on the given item). The underlying negations are semantically significant, therefore deletions must preserve the polarity of the sentence. Postal suggests several conditions that conspire to ensure that the right number of negations get deleted. I propose that these can be collapsed into a single condition:
(132) The evenness condition on neg-deletion:
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Only an analysis with an even number of chained neg-deletions is well-formed.
In some sentences, this condition forces the postulation of further abstract negations that get deleted. For example, (133) is such a case, where the single negation of the ¬∃ of anyone is deleted by a verbal negation, which in turn is deleted by the subject no one.
(133) No one said anything (but hello).
[a] neg3-∃ neg2-V neg1-∃ => neg1 is deleted by neg2; ∃ is spelled out as any [b] neg3-∃ neg2-V any => neg2 is deleted by neg3
[c] neg3-∃ V any => neg3-∃ is spelled out as no
Such a verbal negation can only be deleted by an antiadditive operator. In (115), the deleter of verbal neg2 is the subject no one, indeed an antiadditive. The same analysis would not go through if the subject were merely decreasing, say, at most five people. This accounts for the contrast observed in (115) [a] neg4-∃ neg3-V neg2-neg1-∃ => neg2 deletes neg1
[b] neg4-∃ neg3-V neg2-∃ => neg2-∃ is spelled out as no
[c] neg4-∃ neg3-V no => neg4 deletes neg3
[d] neg4-∃ V no => neg4-∃ is spelled out as no
Notice that the deletion of neg3 in (134) is forced by the even numbers condition. Once neg1 is deleted, another negation must also be. There is an alternative analysis, (135); on my assumptions however this is ruled out by (129):
(135) No one saw NO dog.
[a] neg4-∃ neg3-V neg2-neg1-∃ => neg3 deletes neg2
[b] neg4-∃ neg3-V neg1-∃ => neg1-∃ is spelled out as no
[c] neg4-∃ neg3-V no => neg3 is deleted by neg4
There might be a third option, where neg3 deletes neg1 and neg2 stays in the DP. This might be excluded by a crossing constraint. Now consider how ¬¬∃ gets spelled out as any. This obtains when neg2 deletes neg1 and neg2 is deleted by an external deleter.
(136) John/Few people didn't say anything.
[a] subj neg3-V neg2-neg1-∃ => neg2 deletes neg1
[b] subj neg3-V neg2-∃ => neg3 deletes neg2
[c] subj neg3-V ∃ => ∃ is spelled out as any
[d] subj not-V any
In the above analysis the character of the subject is left unspecified. Whatever it is, it plays no role in the well-formedness of the structure. Alternatively, neg2 might be deleted by any
Strawson-decreasing operator (I will use few as a representative, but it might as well be no itself), without the agency of verbal negation:
(137) Few people said anything.
[a] few V neg2-neg1-∃ => neg2 deletes neg1
[b] few V neg2-∃ => few deletes neg2
[c] few V ∃ => ∃ is spelled out as any
Finally, below is a Postal-style analysis of one PPI-example with two neg-deletions (using my assumptions regarding PPIs):
(138) Few people didn't say something.
[a] few neg3-V neg1-neg2-∃ => neg3 deletes neg1
[b] few neg3-V neg2-∃ => few deletes neg2
[c] few neg3-V ∃ => ∃ is spelled out as some
